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Abstract—This letter considers the design of an auction mech-
anism to sell the object of a seller when the buyers quantize
their private value estimates regarding the object prior to com-
municating them to the seller. The designed auction mechanism
maximizes the utility of the seller (i.e., the auction is optimal),
prevents buyers from communicating falsified quantized bids (i.e.,
the auction is incentive-compatible), and ensures that buyers
will participate in the auction (i.e., the auction is individually-
rational). The letter also investigates the design of the optimal
quantization thresholds using which buyers quantize their private
value estimates. Numerical results provide insights regarding
the influence of the quantization thresholds on the auction
mechanism.
Index Terms—Mechanism design, auctions, binary bids, re-
source constrained network, quantization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of mechanism design (also known as reverse game
theory) aims to study how to implement desired objectives
(social or individual) in systems comprised of multiple selfish
and rational agents, with agents having private information
that influence the solution [1]. Auction design [2], which
falls in the category of mechanism design problems, seeks to
investigate how to allocate an object (such as, a resource) to a
set of buyers, with buyers having private value estimates about
the object, and to determine the price at which to trade the
object via competition among the buyers. In general, auction
design has been a well studied topic in the past. A good
overview of the topic is provided in [2].
However, in traditional auction design (such as, in [2]), it
has been assumed that the buyers send their private infor-
mation, typically considered as analog values, to the seller
in analog form. In contrast, in this letter, we consider the
design of an auction mechanism where the buyers quantize
their private information, i.e., their private analog values, prior
to communication. Quantization of analog private information
prior to communication is practical, for example, when the
buyers and the seller communicate in a resource constrained
environment (such as, with limited bandwidth and energy).
Some example scenarios of such environments include auction
based resource allocation for sensor management [3], [4],
[5], spectrum allocation in Cognitive Radio systems [6], [7],
[8], [9], and routing games in networks [10], [11], [12]. It
should be noted that, design of an auction mechanism with
quantized bids is not only complicated by the fact that the
seller is unaware of the true value estimates of the bidders, but
also by the fact that the seller only gets quantized data from
the buyers that convey information about their private value
estimates. The buyers (being selfish and rational entities) may
intentionally falsify the quantized bids they transmit in order
to acquire an additional advantage, which further complicated
the problem. Moreover, as can be expected, choice of the
quantization thresholds influences the outcome of the auction,
so that the design of the optimal quantization thresholds
becomes important.
In this letter, we design an optimal auction mechanism
where the buyers quantize their analog private value esti-
mates regarding the traded object into binary values prior to
communication. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work till date to investigate this problem. Our auction
mechanism is comprised of three components- a) winner
determination function, which determines the bidder who
wins the object, b) payment function, which determines the
payment to be made by each bidder, and, c) quantization
thresholds, which determine how the buyers will quantize
their private analog value estimates. This letter designs the
aforementioned components of the auction so that the auction
is optimal (i.e., maximizes the seller’s utility), individually-
rational (i.e., rationalizes buyer participation), and incentive-
compatible (i.e., prevents buyers from communicating falsified
binary bids). We also study the influence of the quantization
thresholds on the optimal mechanism via simulations.
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we decribe the auction model considered. Section
III formulates the optimal auction design problem. Section
IV analyzes the problem for given quantization thresholds.
Section V investigates the design of the optimal quantization
thresholds. Finally, Section VI concludes this letter.
II. AUCTION MODEL
The seller, as an auctioneer in our model, has an object
to sell to one of N potential buyers. The buyers, on the
other hand, compete to buy the object from the seller, and
comprise the set of bidders. Each buyer has a private (analog)
value estimate regarding the object, which is unknown to the
seller. The auction with quantized bids is conducted using
the following steps: a) The seller designs an optimal auc-
tion mechanism and the corresponding optimal quantization
thresholds; b) According to the rules set by the seller, the
buyers transmit their quantized bids to the seller; c) The seller
decides the winner of the auction and how much to charge for
the object.
In this letter, we consider the case where the buyers quantize
their private value estimates and transmit binary bids to the
seller to compete for the object. For each buyer i, there is
some private (analog) value estimate vi for the object, and the
corresponding quantized value estimate is denoted as ωi. We
assume that the value estimate of buyer i can be described by
a probability density function f˜i : [ai, bi] → R+, where ai is
buyer i’s lowest value estimate for the object, and bi is his
highest value estimate, and −∞ ≤ ai ≤ bi ≤ ∞. The binary
value estimate of buyer i is defined as:
ωi =
{
0 ai ≤ vi ≤ ηi
1 ηi < vi ≤ bi
(1)
where, ηi is the quantization threshold of buyer i. The seller’s
uncertainty about the binary value estimate of buyer i can be
described by the probability mass function (pmf) of ωi
fi(0) = Pr(ωi = 0) = F (ai ≤ vi ≤ ηi) =
∫ ηi
ai
f˜i(vi)dvi.
(2)
Let Ω denote the set of all possible combinations of buyers’
binary value estimates Ω = {0, 1}N , i.e., the vector ω ∈ Ω.
Similarly, we let Ω−i denote the set of all possible combi-
nations of the value estimates of the buyers other than i, so
that the vector ω−i = [ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωN ]T ∈ Ω−i
where Ω−i = {0, 1}N−1.
The binary value estimates of the buyers are assumed to
be statistically independent with each other. Thus, the joint
pmf of the vector ω is f(ω) =
∏
j=1,...,N fj(ωj). We
assume that buyer i treats the other buyers’ binary value
estimates in a similar way as the seller does. Thus, both the
seller and buyer i consider the joint pmf of the vector of
value estimates for all the buyers other than i, ω−i, to be
f−i(ω−i) =
∏
j=1,...,i−1,i+1,...,N fj(ωj). The seller’s personal
value estimate for the object is denoted by v0.
III. AUCTION DESIGN PROBLEM FORMULATION
The auction design problem is to design the outcome func-
tions q, p, and the quantization thresholds η that maximize the
seller’s expected utility subject to certain constraints, where
q,p : Ω → RN , q = [q1, . . . , qN ]
T
, p = [p1, . . . , pN ]
T
.
Specifically, qi(ω) is the probability of buyer i being selected
by the seller, and pi(ω) is the amount that buyer i has to pay1.
Further, in this letter, we focus on the direct mechanism, where
the buyers directly transmit their binary bids to the seller [13].
By assuming throughout this letter that the seller and the
buyers are risk neutral, we next define the utility functions of
the seller and the buyers. The expected utility of the seller is,
U0(p,q,η) =
∑
ω∈Ω
[
v0
(
1−
N∑
i=1
qi(ω)
)
+
N∑
i=1
pi(ω)
]
f(ω)
(3)
Since buyer i is aware of his actual value estimate vi ∈ [ai, bi],
his expected utility with the binary bid ωi ∈ {0, 1} is described
as
Ui(pi, qi, vi, ωi,η−i) =
∑
ω
−i∈Ω−i
[
viqi(ω)− pi(ω)
]
f−i(ω−i)
(4)
1Notice that, in our formulation, we allow for the possibility that a buyer
may have to pay something even if he is not selected as the winner, but as
we will later show this will not be the case.
where η
−i = [η1, . . . , ηi−1, ηi+1, . . . , ηN ]
T
. Consider now
that buyer i’s actual value estimate vi was supposed to be
quantized to ωi according to (1), but he instead transmits a
binary value estimate ω˜i (ω˜i ∈ {0, 1}, ω˜i needs not to be
equal to ωi). Then, his expected utility would be
U˜i =
∑
ω
−i∈Ω−i
[
viqi(ω˜i,ω−i)− pi(ω˜i,ω−i)
]
f−i(ω−i) (5)
The optimal auction mechanism is designed to maximize the
seller’s expected utility while ensuring some conditions:
maximize
p,q,η
U0(p,q,η)
subject to Ui(pi, qi, vi, ωi,η−i) ≥ 0 (6a)
Ui ≥ U˜i (6b)
N∑
i=1
qi(ω) ≤ 1, ∀ω ∈ Ω (6c)
0 ≤ qi(ω) ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, . . .N} ∀ω ∈ Ω
(6d)
ai ≤ ηi ≤ bi, i ∈ {1, . . .N} (6e)
where vi ∈ [ai, bi] and ω˜i, ωi ∈ {0, 1}. Below we describe
each constraint in detail.
• Individual Rationality (IR) constraint (6a): We assume
that the seller cannot force a buyer to participate in an
auction. If the buyer does not participate in the auction,
he would not get the object, but also would not pay the
seller, so his utility would be zero. Thus, to make buyers
participate in the auction, this condition must be satisfied.
• Incentive-Compatibility (IC) constraint (6b): We assume
that the seller can not prevent any buyer from lying about
his binary value estimate if the buyer is expected to gain
from lying. Thus, to make sure that no buyer has any
incentive to lie about his value estimate, transmission of
true binary value estimates must form a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game.
• Probability constraints (6c) and (6d): Since there is only
one object, the seller can select at most one buyer to sell
his object.
• Threshold constraint (6e): The quantization thresholds are
between the lowest and highest value estimates of each
buyer.
IV. OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN FOR GIVEN
QUANTIZATION THRESHOLDS
In this section, we analyze the optimal mechanism design
problem when the quantization thresholds η are given. We first
state a lemma corresponding to the IC condition of (6b).
Lemma 1. The IC condition holds if and only if the following
conditions hold:
1 Q1i −Q
0
i ≥ 0 (7a)
2 P 1i = P
0
i + ηi(Q
1
i −Q
0
i ). (7b)
where Qli ,
∑
ω
−i
qi(ωi = l, t−i)f−i(ω−i) is the expected
probability that buyer i will be selected when he transmits
his binary value estimate l conditioned on all other buyers’
binary value estimates. Similarly, P li ,
∑
ω
−i
pi(ωi =
l, t−i)f−i(ω−i) is the expected payment buyer i has to pay
when he transmits his binary value estimate l conditioned on
all other buyers’ binary value estimates.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that, the IC conditions in (7a) and (7b) imply the
following: 1) for buyer i, the winning probability for trans-
mitting 1 is no less than that for transmitting 0, 2) if i wins,
the expected amount he has to pay by transmitting 1 is larger
than that of transmitting 0. Thus, the IC condition can be
understood in the following way: if buyer i’s actual value
estimate is supposed to be quantized to 0 according to his
quantization threshold, then he does not have an incentive to
transmit 1 and pay more for the object; if buyer i is supposed
to quantize his actual value estimate to 1, he may have an
incentive to transmit 0 and pay less (higher utility), however,
transmitting 0 instead of 1 will decrease his probability to win
the auction.
Based on Lemma 1, we can simplify the auction design
problem in (6), when the quantization thresholds are given, as
follows.
Theorem 1. The optimal mechanism design problem of (6),
when the quantization thresholds are given, is equivalent to
maximize
q
∑
ω∈Ω
[
N∑
i=1
ui(ωi)qi(ω)
]
f(ω) (8a)
subject to
N∑
i=1
qi(ω) ≤ 1, ∀ω ∈ Ω (6c)
0 ≤ qi(ω) ≤ 1, i ∈ {1, . . .N} ∀ω ∈ Ω
(6d)
where
ui(ωi) =


ai − (1 − λi)ηi
λi
− v0, ωi = 0
ηi − v0, ωi = 1
(9)
with λi = fi(ωi = 0), and the payment to buyer i is given by
pi(ωi,ω−i) = ηiqi(ωi,ω−i)−(ηi−ai)qi(ωi = 0,ω−i) (10)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 1, when the quantization thresholds are
given, the optimal auction mechanism can be described as
follows:
• For any set of realizations of the binary value estimates ω,
the seller compares the corresponding uis (defined based
on (9)), and sells the object to the buyer with the highest
ui. In other words, if ui(ωi) is the highest among all the
buyers, then the solution of the winning probability q is:
qi = 1, qj = 0 for ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , i− 1, i+ 1, · · · , N}.
• Only the buyer that wins the auction needs to pay the
TABLE I
OPTIMAL THRESHOLDS WITH ONE BUYER
v0, a, b ηopt U
opt
0
(b+ v0)/2 > a (b+ v0)/2 (b− v0)2/(4(b − a))
(b+ v0)/2 ≤ a ∀ a− v0
seller for the object, and the payment is,
pi = ai if buyer i wins by transmitting 0
pi = ηi − (ηi − ai)qi(ωi = 0,ω−i)
if buyer i wins by transmitting 1
(11)
Note that, if buyer i wins the auction by transmitting 1,
the seller needs to further determine qi(ωi = 0,ω−i) to
compute the payment, i.e., determine if buyer i would
have still won the auction had his binary bid been 0 for
the same set of binary bids of the other bidders.
• If there is a tie, i.e., multiple bidders have the highest ui,
the seller can arbitrarily choose a winner among them
without affecting his own utility.
V. OPTIMAL QUANTIZATION THRESHOLDS
In Section IV, we have designed an optimal mechanism
when the quantization thresholds η = [η1, . . . , ηN ]T are given.
From Theorem 1, we observe that the thresholds influence
the outcome of the auction mechanism. In this section, we
investigate the design of the optimal quantization thresholds by
assuming that the value estimates of the buyers are uniformly
distributed. We also study the impact of the quantization
thresholds by applying our auction model for spectrum auc-
tions in Section V-A.
We first study the case when there is only one buyer who
is interested in the object. The value estimate of the buyer is
assumed to be in [a, b]. With only one buyer, the objective
function (8a) in the optimization problem (8) is (note that the
indices have been omitted)
u(ω = 0)q(0)λ+ u(ω = 1)q(1)(1− λ)
=
(η − a)(η − b − v0 + a)
b− a
q(0) +
(b − η)(η − v0)
b − a
q(1)
(12)
The seller maximizes (12) over η and (q(0), q(1)) subject to
the constraints that a ≤ η ≤ b, 0 ≤ q(0) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q(1) ≤ 1.
The following lemma gives the optimal quantization threshold
ηopt when only one buyer is interested in the object with
different parameter settings.
Lemma 2. The seller keeps the object instead of selling it
to the buyer if v0 > b. When v0 ≤ b, the seller designs the
optimal quantization threshold η: if (b+v0)/2 > a, the optimal
value for η is (b + v0)/2, otherwise, η can be any value in
[a, b]. The details are shown in Table I.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Next we consider the scenario when there are multiple
bidders. The seller optimizes the expected value in (8a), where
the problem of finding the optimal q when η is given in (8)
is a linear optimization problem, which can be solved with
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the MATLAB function “linprog”. To illustrate the influence
of the quantization thresholds on the auction mechanism, we
next provide some numerical examples. First, we assume that
there are N = 2 buyers, v0 = 10, a1 = 2, b1 = 8, and
a2 = 12, b2 = 20. The expected utility as a function of
η = [η1, η2]
T is shown in Fig. 1. Since v0 > b1 and b1 < a2,
the seller would always select buyer 2 as the winning bidder.
In this case, it is irrelevant for the seller to consider buyer 1’s
actual (binary) value estimate, and thus any η1 ∈ [a1, b1] is
equally good for the seller. Therefore, as can be seen from
Fig. 1, the expected utility of the seller changes only with
buyer 2’s quantization threshold, and is invariant of buyer 1’s
quantization threshold. From Fig. 1, it can also be seen that
the optimal threshold for buyer 2 is η2 = 15.
In Fig. 2, we study the scenario where v0 = 10, a1 =
5, b1 = 15, and a2 = 8, b2 = 20. The expected utility of the
seller is a function of both buyer’s quantization thresholds,
since the interval of the two buyers’ value estimates are
overlapped. As can be seen from the figure, the seller sets
the quantization thresholds to be η1 = 13, η2 = 15 to obtain
the optimal expected utility.
A. Spectrum Auctions: Impact of Bid Quantization
We now study the impact of bid quantization by applying
our auction model to spectrum auction [14] in cognitive radio
systems, where the traded object is spectrum. In the spectrum
auction problem, a primary user (PU) when not using a certain
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Fig. 3. Utility of the seller (PU) with number of bidders (SUs).
portion of his assigned spectrum, solicits bids from a set of
secondary users (SU) to sell the unused spectrum (refer to
[14] for an overview of spectrum auctions). As was mentioned
earlier, past literature [14] on the design of spectrum auctions
only considers communication of analog bids from SUs and
has not considered the design of optimal auctions when SUs
transmit quantized bids. To gain insights into the dynamics
of auction mechanism with quantized bids in the context of
spectrum auctions, we study the expected utility of the PU
(i.e., the seller) when the SUs (i.e., the bidders) send analog
bids as well as when the SUs transmit quantized bids.
Fig. 3 presents the expected utility of the PU under both
scenarios. The bid of each bidder is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over [5, 20]. We base our results, for the case
when SUs send analog bids (‘Analog’ in Fig. 3), on the spec-
trum auction proposed in [15]. For the case when SUs send
quantized bids, we consider optimal quantization thresholds
(‘Binary Optimal’ in Fig. 3) as well as quantization thresholds
chosen randomly in an uniform manner (‘Binary Random’ in
Fig. 3). We observe that for all cases, the expected utility of
the PU increases as the number of bidders increases. This is
because with increasing number of SUs, the chances of the
PU finding a bidder with higher value estimate increase. As
expected, the expected utility of the PU with quantized bids
is lower than that with analog bids. Also, the use of optimal
quantization thresholds result in a higher utility at the seller
than when thresholds are chosen randomly.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we designed an optimal auction mechanism
for an environment where bidders quantize their value esti-
mates regarding the traded object into binary values prior to
communicating them to the seller. The mechanism is designed
to maximize the seller’s expected utility while ensuring the
individual rationality (IR) and incentive-compatibility (IC)
constraints. The letter also investigated the design of the
optimal quantization thresholds, using which buyers would
quantize their private value estimates, such that the seller’s
expected utility is maximized.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Recall (6b) and (10), we get the equivalent IC conditions
as
viQ
0
i − P
0
i ≥ viQ
1
i − P
1
i , ∀vi ∈ [ai, ηi] (13a)
wiQ
1
i − P
1
i ≥ wiQ
0
i − P
0
i , ∀wi ∈ (ηi, bi] (13b)
Since (13a) and (13b) can be directly written as
vi(Q
1
i −Q
0
i ) ≤ P
1
i − P
0
i , ∀vi ∈ [ai, ηi] (14a)
wi(Q
1
i −Q
0
i ) ≥ P
1
i − P
0
i , ∀wi ∈ (ηi, bi] (14b)
If Q0i = Q1i , (14a) and (14b) imply the condition that P 0i =
P 1i . If Q1i < Q0i , (14a) and (14b) are equivalent to
vi ≥
P 1i − P
0
i
Q1i −Q
0
i
, ∀vi ∈ (ai, ηi]
wi ≤
P 1i − P
0
i
Q1i −Q
0
i
, ∀wi ∈ (ηi, bi)
Then the condition bi ≤
P 1i − P
0
i
Q1i −Q
0
i
≤ ai must be satisfied,
which is contradictory to our definition of buyers’ value
estimates. With Q1i > Q0i , we have
vi ≤
P 1i − P
0
i
Q1i −Q
0
i
, ∀vi ∈ [ai, ηi]
wi ≥
P 1i − P
0
i
Q1i −Q
0
i
, ∀wi ∈ (ηi, bi].
(15)
So that Q1i ≥ Q0i , and ηi =
P 1i − P
0
i
Q1i −Q
0
i
. Thus the lemma is
proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The IR constraint of (6a) can be considered for the two
cases as:
Ui(pi, qi, vi, ωi = 0) ≥ 0, ∀vi ∈ [ai, ηi] (16a)
Ui(pi, qi, vi, ωi = 1) ≥ 0, ∀vi ∈ [ηi, bi]. (16b)
We may write the seller’s objective function of (6) as
U0(p,q)
= v0 −
N∑
i=1
v0
(∑
ω∈Ω
qi(ω)f(ω)
)
+
N∑
i=1
∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)f(ω)
= v0 −
N∑
i=1
v0
[
λiQ
0
i + (1 − λi)Q
1
i
]
+
N∑
i=1
[
λiP
0
i + (1− λi)P
1
i
]
(17)
By (7b) in Lemma 1, we know that
λiP
0
i + (1− λi)P
1
i
=λiP
0
i + (1− λi)
[
P 0i + ηi(Q
1
i −Q
0
i )
]
=P 0i + (1− λi)ηi(Q
1
i −Q
0
i )
(18)
The expected payment of buyer i for ∀vi ∈ [ai, ηi] is
P 0i = −Ui(pi, qi, vi, ωi = 0) + viQ
0
i ,
with vi = ai,
P 0i = −Ui(pi, qi, vi = ai, ωi = 0) + aiQ
0
i (19)
Substituting (18) and (19) into (17) gives us:
U0(p,q)
=−
N∑
i=1
v0
[
λiQ
0
i + (1− λi)Q
1
i
]
+
N∑
i=1
[
(1− λi)ηi(Q
1
i −Q
0
i ) + aiQ
0
i
]
+ v0 −
N∑
i=1
Ui(pi, qi, vi = ai, ωi = 0)
=
N∑
i=1
{
λi
[ai − (1− λi)ηi
λi
− v0
]
Q0i + (1− λi)(ηi − v0)Q
1
i
}
+ v0 −
N∑
i=1
Ui(pi, qi, vi = ai, ωi = 0)
(20)
In (20), the payment vector only appears in the last term of
the utility of the seller. Also, by the IR constraint (16a), we
know that
Ui(pi, qi, vi = ai, ωi = 0) ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (21)
Therefore, to maximize (20) subject to the constraints, the
winning buyer must make payment to the seller according to:
Ui(pi, qi, vi = ai, ωi = 0) = 0 (22)
which, combined with (19) and (7b), gives the following
payment functions
P 0i = aiQ
0
i
P 1i = ηiQ
1
i − (ηi − ai)Q
0
i
(23)
From (23), we get the payment of buyer i regarding his binary
value estimate ωi in (10). Further, substituting the payment
functions (23) into the objective function (17), we get (8a)
and (9).
To further check the condition in (7a), we observe that
ηi ≥
ai − (1− λi)ηi
λi
(24)
So that ui(ωi = 1) ≥ ui(ωi = 0), which means that whenever
buyer i could win the auction by transmitting a binary value
estimate 0, he could also win if he changed it to 1. That
is, given other buyers’ binary value estimates, the expected
probability that buyer i would win when he transmits his
value estimate to be 1 is higher than that when he transmits
0, i.e., (7a) is satisfied. Moreover, (7b) is considered in (18),
and the IR condition is satisfied as shown in (22). Therefore,
the optimization problem considered in (6) is equivalent to
maximizing the objective function (20) subject to the buyer
selection probability constraints (6c) and (6d). This proves the
theorem.
TABLE II
OPTIMAL QUANTIZATION THRESHOLDS WITH ONE BUYER.
v0, a, b η qopt(0) qopt(1) ηopt U
opt
0
v0 > b ((b + v0)/2 > b) a ≤ η ≤ b 0 0 ∀ 0
a < v0 ≤
b+v0
2
≤ b < b− a+ v0
a < η < v0 0 0 ∀ 0
v0 < η < b 0 1 (b + v0)/2 (b − v0)2/(4(b − a))
η = b OR η = v0 0 ∀ ∀ 0
η = a ∀ 0 ∀ 0
v0 = a
η = a OR η = b ∀ ∀ ∀ 0
a < η < b 0 1 (b + v0)/2 (b − v0)2/(4(b − a))
v0 < a <
b+v0
2
< b− a+ v0 < b
η = a OR η = b− a + v0 ∀ 1 a OR b− a+ v0 a− v0
a < η < b− a+ v0 0 1 (b + v0)/2 (b − v0)2/(4(b − a))
b− a + v0 < η < b 1 1 ∀ a− v0
η = b 1 ∀ b a− v0
v0 < b− a + v0 ≤
b+v0
2
≤ a < b
η = a ∀ 1 a a− v0
η = b 1 ∀ b a− v0
a < η < b 1 1 ∀ a− v0
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
With only one buyer, the objective function (8a) in the
optimization problem (8) is (note that the index has been
omitted)
u(ω = 0)q(0)λ+ u(ω = 1)q(1)(1− λ)
= λ
[a− (1− λ)η
λ
− v0
]
q(0) + (1 − λ)(η − v0)q(1)
=
η2 − (b + v0)η + av0 + a(b− a)
b− a
q(0)
+
−η2 + (b+ v0)η − bv0
b− a
q(1)
=
(η − a)(η − b+ a− v0)
b− a
q(0) +
(b − η)(η − v0)
b− a
q(1)
, Mq(0) +Nq(1)
(25)
where M , [(η − a)(η − b + a − v0)]/(b − a) and N ,
[(b − η)(η − v0)]/(b − a), and a ≤ η ≤ b, 0 ≤ q(0) ≤ 1,
0 ≤ q(1) ≤ 1,
We observe that the optimal solutions for qopt(0), qopt(1),
and ηopt depend on the relationship among the parameters of
the system. Thus, we list all the conditions and the correspond-
ing solutions in Table II2. From the table, it can be observed
that when v0 > b (row 1 of Table II), the seller does not
sell the object, so that design of the quantization thresholds
is irrelevant. Otherwise, if (b + v0)/2 > a (rows 2, 3 and 4),
then, since it can be shown that (b− vo)2/4(b− a) ≥ a− v0
for any real values of a, b, and v0, the optimal quantization
threshold can be set as (b+v0)/2. However, if (b+v0)/2 ≤ a
(row 5), any value in [a,b] is equally good as a quantization
threshold. This proves the lemma.
2Notation “∀” for qopt represents that qopt can be either 1 or 0, and notation
“∀” for ηopt represents that ηopt can be any value between [a, b].
